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SUMMARY
The rise of fintech has attracted increased attention from investors, entrepreneurs, 
existing financial-sector participants and regulators. Fintech has many potential 
benefits and it could transform banking, lending, payments, investing and other 
financial services through the internet, smartphones, artificial intelligence, 
blockchain and cryptocurrencies, and many other current and future digital 
technologies. Such benefits include lower costs, an enhanced scope of products 
and services, and the possibility of reaching and offering previously underserved 
customers greater credit and financial services. Policy makers in Canada and 
the U.S. should encourage these positive developments, foster innovation and 
competition, and reduce barriers to entry, while ensuring adequate safeguards 
are established for the stability of the financial system and necessary consumer 
protections are in place.
The market environment and regulatory approaches in Canada and the U.S. 
are similar but not uniform. Each jurisdiction faces different challenges and 
opportunities. The speed and complexity that this new wave of fintech has 
expanded throughout North America and the world, in just a few years, has 
created regulatory challenges for authorities in the U.S. and Canada. Fintech has 
many potential risks. If this revolution is not managed well, the results could be 
serious, including the risk of destabilizing the financial system.
In the U.S., fintech has the potential for displacing banks and established 
financial institutions. There is also significant regulatory fragmentation and a 
growing desire for “principles-based” regulation - away from the “rules” based 
frameworks which generally characterize U.S. financial oversight. Several federal 
1and state regulators have instituted “regulatory sandboxes,” which are an innovation that 
allows fintech firms to experiment with financial products and services in a limited and 
supervised way with potential relief from otherwise strict rules.
Canada’s financial regulatory structure is principles-based, and there is a healthy regulatory 
sandbox in securities jurisdiction. In Canada, due to high barriers to entry, and regulatory 
fragmentation for some fintech market segments not under federal oversight, fintech has 
been heavily driven by existing big banks. These incumbents often partner with upstart 
fintech firms to develop products and services inside the bank’s existing infrastructure to 
enhance customer service and operations. As a result, new consumer-facing fintech firms 
in Canada are less prominent than in the U.S., which enjoys far greater levels of funding 
for fintech start-ups.
Fintech creates new types of risks. When banks internally adopt fintech innovations into 
their existing processes and services there is cyber-risk and customer data vulnerability 
through new interface technologies, and risk to the stability of the financial system if 
more riskier borrowers are quickly approved for credit using algorithmic processes. Banks 
partnering with technology companies must also monitor and manage third parties. This 
requires heightened due diligence and ongoing monitoring costs.
Fintech innovations promoted outside the big banks by new, consumer-facing firms 
present their own challenges. Among these are increased moral hazard in peer-to-peer 
lending, the move toward higher-speed transactions (such as faster loan approvals) 
increasing systemic risk, and the possibility of algorithmic investing advice causing 
investor herds, and increasing the fall-out from a potential crash in certain sectors or asset 
classes. There is also risk from decentralized fintech innovations – like the widespread 
adoption of payment tokens like Bitcoin – as well as from new capital raising processes 
like initial coin offerings. The challenge, therefore, to regulators of properly overseeing so 
many new and untested developments without stifling innovation and the availability of 
new products is formidable — and also somewhat daunting.
In both jurisdictions, policy makers must be mindful of fintech’s unique risk propositions 
and its benefits; both when it’s adopted internally by existing financial institutions under 
regulatory oversight, and when fintech originates from new, consumer-facing market 
entrants. They must also ensure that regulatory efforts are coordinated with international 
best-practices and be mindful of any potential unintended effects of regulatory action 
given an increasingly complex and interconnected financial market.
2I. INTRODUCTION
In the decade following the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC), smartphones and cellular 
access have become ubiquitous and advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) and data 
management have emerged alongside distributed ledger technology (“blockchain”) and 
machine learning. These factors, together with the coming of age of a generation raised 
with the internet, has facilitated the integration of new technology into financial-market 
products, processes and services. This phenomenon is popularly called fintech (short 
for financial technology). Fintech is a promising development. It can lower the costs of 
financial services and products, enhance transaction speed and scope, increase credit 
access, and facilitate more efficient financial intermediation. However, it also poses 
unique new risks, not otherwise present in the financial system.
This article contrasts Canada’s fintech industry and regulatory response against 
the United States. In the U.S. there is disintermediation potential and regulatory 
fragmentation under a rules-based framework, with a growing desire for principles-based 
supervision. Gaining prominence is the “regulatory sandbox” structure — a supervisory 
framework where fintech firms experiment with financial products and services, in a 
limited capacity, under regulatory oversight and relief. Canada has principles-based 
regulation and a national sandbox for fintech within security-regulatory jurisdiction. 
Fintech in Canada is also largely bank-driven, with many bank-tech partnerships. 
Regulators in both jurisdictions have the challenge of enacting policy guidelines, 
procedures and rules to mitigate fintech’s unique new risks while ensuring stable and 
economically productive markets, a healthy ecosystem for ongoing innovation, and 
welfare-enhancing competition. Fragmentation exists in Canada for non-bank fintech 
firms that aren’t federal financial institutions under the supervision of the Office of 
the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) — such as non-bank peer-to-peer 
lending platforms or mobile-payments applications (Competition Bureau 2017, 49-63). 
Fragmentation isn’t pervasive in Canada, however, because of the dominance of its large 
banks in financial services. 
The article first defines fintech, notes its historical context, and documents its 
emergence. It then explores jurisdictional distinctions, unique fintech risks and regulatory 
responses and difficulties, such as agency overlap, and regulatory fragmentation. Next 
it surveys several fintech sub-sectors including banking, cryptocurrency and initial coin 
offerings (ICOs), fintech credit and marketplace lending, payments, robo-advisers and 
financial-account aggregators. Fintech also includes innovations like “insurtech,” the 
marriage of insurance and technology, and “proptech,” property technology that uses 
developments such as artificial intelligence, virtual reality and machine learning (Galea 
2018). These developments, as well as traditional equity crowdfunding, are beyond 
the scope of this study. The article will conclude by noting the status of blockchain 
financial integration, regulatory technology (“regtech”) rollouts, international regulatory 
co-operation initiatives, and areas of continuing research, including the challenge of 
regulating increasingly complex and interconnected financial markets. 
3II. DEFINING FINTECH: INTRODUCTION TO KEY CONCEPTS
I. FINTECH DEFINED: GENERAL OVERVIEW
Fintech has diverse meanings. The Financial Stability Board has described it as 
“technologically enabled financial innovation that could result in new business models, 
applications, processes, or products with an associated material effect on financial 
markets and institutions and the provision of financial services” (Basel Committee 2018, 
8). Fintech also captures any innovation that impacts a business or financial transaction 
(Kagan 2019). The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, in a report to the World 
Bank, defined fintech as “companies that use technology to make financial systems and 
the delivery of financial services more efficient” (Ancri 2016). Fintech includes products 
from new firms, driven by consumer demand for underserved markets, and innovations 
from banks that use new technology to enhance customer experience and make internal 
processes more efficient, such as credit-scoring algorithms for faster mortgage approval 
(Badour, Lynde and Firestone 2017) and infrastructure-support services, such as data 
and compliance systems (Gilroy 2017). Ernst and Young estimates that one-third of 
consumers worldwide used some form of fintech in 2017, and 84 per cent were aware of 
fintech products (CNBC 2017). This trend is also influenced by Bitcoin’s historic price run 
(and crash) over the past two years (Chambers 2018). Fintech presents a dichotomy of 
benefit and risk. Competition in financial services can reduce costs, enhance the scope 
and benefits of financial products, and deepen credit markets by intermediating new 
investors with borrowers (Bailey 2018, 95). It can also enhance the consumer experience 
by developing better technological interfaces (Cutts and Roman, 2016, 1).
II. FINTECH AS A HISTORICAL PHENOMENON
Events like the 1866 transatlantic cable and the launch of automated teller machines 
in the late 1960s are also iterations of fintech (Douglas and Grinberg 2017, 669). 
Just as financial markets and products have evolved with the advent of information 
technology, so too has fintech. Other examples include financial-data management on 
mainframe computers and the rise of the internet and e-commerce, which created retail 
electronic banking and online securities trading (Desai 2015). A recent Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision report (2018, 9) defined fintech as including both “sectoral 
innovations” and “market support services,” with the former covering “credit, deposit, 
and capital raising services,” “payments, clearing and settlement services,” financial 
“investment management services,” and market-support services, including “portal and 
data aggregators, ecosystems, data applications, distributed ledger technology, cyber-
security, cloud computing, Internet of things, and artificial intelligence.” The largest 
sector noted was “payments, clearing and settlement services” (Basel Committee 
2018, 10). Fintech could also be an “antidote” to unproductive financial institution 
“rent-seeking” behaviour (Kidd 2018, 165). These explanations rely on a conventional 
economic-demand view of financial innovation, yet, some theorists consider financial 
innovation to be supply-driven and created by profit-seeking financial firms (Awrey 2012, 
258-267).
4III.  POST-CRISIS PARADIGM, TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND  
KEY TRENDS
The rise of fintech is a product of multiple factors, including distrust of financial 
institutions in the U.S. post-GFC (Arner, Barberis and Buckley 2016, 1318) and technology 
companies seeking out market segments with heightened post-GFC regulatory scrutiny 
(Zetzsche et al. 2017, 31). Fintech firms are pursuing customers that are historically 
underserved and more strictly regulated after the crisis (Rooney 2018). In both 
jurisdictions, the coming of age of a technologically savvy generation makes for rising 
demand (Hartmans 2016). The most important technology for fintech is a smartphone. 
According to a recent Pew Research Center report (2018), over 95 per cent of Americans 
own a cell phone, with 77 per cent having one capable of a fintech application. In Canada, 
recent estimates identify over 24 million people owning a smartphone in 2017 (Statista 
2019). Another factor is changing customer behaviour and demand for “digital financial 
services” (Basel Committee 2018, 14). Also, age-shift dynamics heighten fintech interest 
as millennials and post-millennial “iGens” have begun using banking and financial services 
independent of their parents (Nonninger 2018).
Emerging trends also include development in fintech payments, algorithmic wealth 
management and investment advice (“robo-advisers”), online or peer-to-peer lending, 
and distributed-ledger technology-based products, with applications in both blockchain 
use cases and cryptocurrency (Stanley 2018). Other trends include voice-activated 
and “dueling” AI, fintech payment and banking interfacing with mobile-phone texting 
services, enhanced collaboration of innovators and regulators, more blockchain use 
cases, and an extended focus on products for lower-income individuals — commonly 
called the “financial inclusion” movement (CNBC 2018). Blockchain roll-outs for privacy 
and identity protection are also being investigated (Kimbrell 2018). A growing number of 
technology “incubators” or “accelerators” are providing business infrastructure and legal 
support for fintech startups and the banks that support these hubs often acquire the 
fintech firms (Walker 2017, 142, 145-146). The use of these and similar mechanisms, like 
bank-sponsored “in-house labs,” “beachheads” and university institutional support help 
to accelerate fintech market integration and product take-up by consumers and financial 
institutions (Stikeman Elliot 2018).
III.  REGULATORY RESPONSE: IDENTIFYING  
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
I. GENERAL REGULATORY DIFFICULTIES AND JURISDICTIONAL DISTINCTIONS
Fintech is a disruptive phenomenon with disintermediation potential for incumbent 
financial institutions (Brummer 2015, 977, 1020-1023). This presents many challenges and 
complexities for regulators. Depending on the firm, regulatory considerations extend to 
prudential matters (such as capital, liquidity and operational controls) market conduct, 
anti-trust, credit risk, and interconnection risk (Laplante and Watson 2018). It may also 
have implications for systemic risk (Petrou 2018). It clearly creates a vulnerability for 
cybersecurity, identity theft, privacy, criminal activity and data-breach risk (Waddell 
2018). Also, as noted by the Competition Bureau of Canada (2017, 17), fintech companies 
5may trigger a failure of “institutional governance, risks to consumers and investors, 
asymmetry of information (between financial services consumers and suppliers) and 
financial literacy, counterparty risks in payments.” 
There is a potential for an expertise differential given the speed of innovation and 
the slow pace of the legislative or rule-making process (Zetzsche et al. 2017, 38). 
Compounding this challenge is the issue of definitional clarity. For example, Blockchain 
technologies, and crypto-assets in general, are difficult to precisely define, and 
regulating them can facilitate inconsistent rules and “regulatory capture”; therefore, 
it’s very challenging for a regulator to keep pace with disruption while simultaneously 
encouraging innovation (Walch 2017, 730-732). Regulators also do not want to enact 
bad rules with incomplete information, since poorly constructed regulations create new 
problems and “unsuitable regulatory frameworks” stifling innovation, competition and 
productivity growth (Chiu 2016, 111-112). This motivates a “do no harm” approach by the 
regulators (Tan 2018). Nevertheless, the failure to act is also risky because, as Hester 
Peirce, commissioner of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, has identified, 
regulators are criticized when innovation harms investors (Peirce 2018). Yet onerous 
regulatory rules can drive “regulatory arbitrage” where firms seek out less rigorous 
jurisdictions to operate from (Panel on Fintech 2018).
The Canadian and U.S. fintech markets and regulatory frameworks have many 
similarities, but also key differences. The U.S. system of financial regulation is much more 
complex than Canada’s, including more supervisory agencies (Jackson 2013; Savage 
2014). Regulatory fragmentation is a much greater concern in the U.S. Canada has an 
“integrated” regulatory approach with a central financial regulator (the OSFI) for federal 
financial institutions (where most financial transactions occur) subject to a “consistent 
risk-assessment system” (Savage 2014, 44-45). Financial regulation in Canada is largely 
principles-based (Ford 2010; Pan 2011; Whitestone 2005), in contrast to the American 
regulatory model, which favours rules-based frameworks (Vartanian 2016). There is an 
appetite in the U.S. for a more principles-based approach (Deloitte 2015), and certain 
industry segments, such as derivatives, use them (Ford 2010, 6; Pan 2011, 840, 847). 
Despite a principles-based approach, Canada has been criticized for lagging in fintech 
development (Competition Bureau 2017, 4; Carmichael 2018). Also, adoption rates of 
non-bank fintech products in Canada is lower than global averages, including in the U.S. 
(Hinton et al. 2017, 2), and the U.S. has more venture funding for fintech startups than 
Canada does (PWC 2016, 9). 
An explanation for the low number of new fintech market entrants in Canada is the 
stability of its major banks, who adopt fintech internally and compete directly with non-
bank startups (PWC 2016). Also, customer-retention rates for Canadian banks are higher 
than their American counterparts (Watson and LaPlante 2018, 3). The dominant market 
position and risk-averse nature (Hinton et al. 2017, 2) of major Canadian banks may be 
a barrier to entry for smaller non-bank firms as the former can “use their economies of 
scale, resources, brand and expertise to compete” (PWC 2016, 11). Concentration of the 
financial services industry is much greater in Canada than in the U.S. (Hinton et al. 2017, 
2). Also, because Canadians are used to dealing with a large bank, having customers 
transact with a non-bank fintech requires a “shift” in trust to the non-bank entity, which 
can be difficult to obtain (Hinton et al. 2017, 2). Recent studies identify that Canadian 
6financial institutions engage in partnerships with fintech companies at a nine-per-
cent higher rate than financial institutions in the United States and the Canadian rate 
is also 15-per-cent higher than the worldwide average (Watson and LaPlante 2018, 4). 
This highlights another important difference between the two jurisdictions: Canadian 
adoption of fintech tends to favour existing financial institutions utilizing technology 
to enhance customer service and operations, while the U.S. landscape has a greater 
proportion of consumer-facing new market entrants. 
II. AGENCY JURISDICTIONAL OVERLAP AND REGULATORY FRAGMENTATION 
A regulatory concern prominently featured in a recent report by the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (2018) is overlapping jurisdiction between U.S. agencies causing 
conflicting guidance, fragmentation, and uncertainty regarding which agency has 
primary enforcement jurisdiction, as well as opaque consumer-grievance procedures. 
Depending on the actions a fintech firm undertakes, the nature of the firm itself, and the 
jurisdictions it operates in, it could be subject to a complex, fragmented and potentially 
conflicting array of federal, state and self-regulatory organization rules and requirements 
(GAO 2018). A fragmented regulatory structure can increase costs, stifle innovation, 
and produce ineffective regulation (GAO 2018). The U.S. Treasury Department (2018), 
in a recent fintech report, called for reduced fragmentation using “unified oversight 
structures,” greater “regulatory co-operation,” and the appointment of “primary” 
regulators for certain fintech industries. To help facilitate regulatory co-operation, the 
U.S. Federal Reserve also enacted, in March 2017, an “Interagency Fintech Discussion 
Forum” (Reiners 2018). Fragmentation in the U.S. is particularly relevant for marketplace 
lending, virtual currency, money transmission and securities (Knight 2017). It has been 
also argued that the U.S. lags in consumer financial technology because it lacks a unified 
“competition authority” (Van Loo 2018).
There is no single oversight body in Canada for fintech firms, and non-bank companies 
could be subject to regulation at both the provincial and federal level (Competition 
Bureau 2017, 6). The Competition Bureau (2017, 4-6) suggests that, as a result, “Canada 
lags behind its international peers when it comes to fintech adoption” and a “unified 
policy lead on fintech” should “combine federal, provincial and territorial expertise 
to facilitate fintech development and improve the scope and applicability of existing 
initiatives.” Fragmentation in Canada does not exist when a bank internally adopts fintech 
since the OSFI is the primary bank regulator in Canada, and the vast majority of financial 
transactions in the country are conducted through banks (Sale 2018). Fragmentation 
and agency overlap have been identified by the Competition Bureau (2017, 49, 63) and 
leading law firms (Borden Ladner Gervais 2016, 2; Dentons 2017) as an issue for non-
bank, consumer-facing, fintech entrants including fintech-credit-lending platforms, 
robo-advisers and non-bank payment-processing companies that aren’t subject to 
OSFI oversight. Non-bank fintech firms in Canada are, however, only a tiny proportion 
of the total market (Hinton, Lombardi and Wajda 2017, 2-3). Also, the area of consumer 
protection has been cited for non-bank fintech entrants as “an area of shared jurisdiction 
that is unnecessarily complex and lacks uniformity in many areas of relevance to fintech” 
and navigating this web of concurrent federal and provincial legislation can be both 
costly and a potential barrier to entry for new firms (Borden Ladner Gervais 2016, 4).
7III.  FINTECH’S UNIQUE NEW RISKS AND ASSOCIATED  
REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS
Fintech encompasses demand-driven, consumer-facing new entrants to the 
financial-services industry (such as non-bank peer-to-peer lending platforms, new 
cryptocurrencies, crowdsourced digital tokens as a means of enterprise fundraising, 
non-bank algorithmic wealth-management platforms, and downstream mobile “intra-
network” retail-payments innovations and digital wallets) (Competition Bureau 2017, 
49). Fintech also encompasses technological innovations developed by (or for) existing 
financial institutions to enhance customer experience and make internal processes more 
efficient. The extent to which bank-adopted fintech introduces new instabilities hinges on 
whether new risks are not otherwise mitigated in existing regulatory frameworks. There 
is a potential for bank fintech to introduce new cyber risks (such as customer data loss 
or hacking) through new technology interfaces and online applications (McMillan 2016, 
4). Also, technology that speeds up credit applications could fund more risky loans, and 
banks that adopt fintech through partnerships introduce costly “third-party/vendor-
management” risks with a new need for “due diligence, contract management, and 
continual monitoring of their party operations” (LaPlante and Watson 2018, 6).
Professor William Magnuson (2018, 1226) has argued that non-bank fintech firms 
introduce “new and different concerns than those presented by conventional financial 
institutions” given the interaction of “small disaggregated actors” and decentralized 
markets. He adds that disaggregated actors present a greater systemic risk to financial 
markets than “too-big-to-fail” financial institutions because small actors, with fewer 
resources, are “more vulnerable to adverse economic shocks” than are large banks 
(Magnuson 2018, 1171). Also, small consumer-facing firms are more difficult to monitor 
than large entities because of “opaque” operations and high information asymmetries 
(Magnuson 2018, 1203). Correspondingly, new firms generate a “collective action 
problem” that limits market-participant “co-operation” because smaller firms are “less 
restricted by reputational constraints,” such as herding risk in algorithmic investment-
management programs (Magnuson 2018, 1199, 1209). Another concern is that new fintech 
firms can transact internationally through the internet, which necessitates greater cross-
border regulatory co-ordination (Magnuson 2018, 1222-1223).
For non-bank fintech firms, another unique risk is that new entrants may provide similar 
products and services as those provided by heavily regulated entities, with reduced 
supervisory treatment, and in the process introduce instabilities into the financial system 
(Competition Bureau 2017, 2). Non-bank fintech peer-to-peer credit platforms could 
also induce what the Competition Bureau (2017, 47) describes as a disintermediating 
“principal-agent problem,” in that “the platform may underprice risk or approve or 
facilitate loans to overly risky borrowers, collecting the origination fee while shifting the 
default risk entirely onto investors.” Also, these platforms, which use non-traditional (and 
deeply guarded) credit-scoring algorithms, could engage in “investor redlining” and have 
a disparate impact on loan disapprovals for marginalized classes (Bailey 2018, 61; Ancri 
2016, 21). Further, fintech loans that are sourced through non-bank portals could increase 
credit and cyber risk and liquidity concerns (Hinton, Lombardi and Wajda 2017, 4). Non-
bank lending platforms may introduce “data movement” risks (such as screen scraping), 
8accuracy risks in non-traditional credit-scoring algorithms, and opacity risks when non-
bank lenders fail to report to credit-scoring agencies (Ancri 2016, 21). Further, just like 
regulated financial institutions, non-bank fintech firms introduce data-breach risks; 
however, unlike large banks, they may not have the financial resources to establish secure 
cyber-security protections (LaPlante and Watson 2018, 5).
New research from the U.S. shows that, for many of the largest ICOs of 2017, there is a 
computer-coding “disconnect” between the promises made by issuers in white papers 
and other marketing materials (such as token-vesting conditions, token-supply limits 
and code-modification rights) and the actual smart-contract code for the respective 
ICO (Cohney et al., forthcoming). Therefore, a unique fintech regulatory development is 
that securities supervisors, in both jurisdictions, must consider the costs and benefits of 
matching ICO disclosure materials to their corresponding smart-contract code (Cohney 
et al., forthcoming, 72). Additionally, cryptocurrency trading on an unregulated spot 
exchange can lead to consumer losses (from hacking and fraud) without compensation 
recourse (LaPlante and Watson 2018, 5). Another non-bank fintech-unique risk and 
regulatory concern is that payments applications, operating outside of traditional 
financial institutions, could drive more money laundering (McMillan 2016, 4). This 
stimulates the need for greater international regulatory co-ordination (LaPlante and 
Watson 2018, 8). 
The extent that fintech will increase systemic risk is unknown (Bailey 2018, 81-83, 92-
94). It may be interconnecting institutions (both technology and financial) as well 
as consumers, and increasing contagion risk (LaPlante and Watson 2018, 7). Robo-
advisers, which use exchange-traded funds in model portfolios, could exacerbate “pro-
cyclical” investor herding and increase volatility in a crisis, and also deepen “model risk” 
through correlated algorithms (LaPlante and Watson 2018, 8). Professor Saule Omarova 
(forthcoming, 55-58) argues that fintech has very unique and serious regulatory and 
systemic consequences that transcend the “transactional aspects of finance” that didn’t 
previously exist before fintech. She points to cryptocurrency, blockchain and robo-
advising, as amplifying the destabilizing impact of “synthesizing” financial assets and 
“scaling up” trading speed and volume, undermining the regulator’s ability to respond 
effectively to system-wide risks (Omarova, forthcoming, 27, 28, 55-58).
IV. INTRODUCTION TO THE “REGULATORY SANDBOX” MODEL OF SUPERVISION
A regulatory innovation gaining prominence in fintech is the “regulatory sandbox.” 
A sandbox is a “safe space” where companies operate in a limited capacity and 
receive regulatory relief from traditional rules (for instance, no-action letters or 
waivers). The U.K.’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) was the first to embrace this 
regulatory model in an attempt to establish the U.K. as “the global capital of financial 
technology” (Barefoot 2016, 1). Regulators’ willingness to engage with fintech firms on a 
“collaborative” basis through a sandbox may be due to an alignment of these firms’ goals 
(lower fees, an enhanced user base for financial services and more efficient and secure 
transactions) with that of the regulator (a desire for economic development, enhanced 
competition, consumer protection, reduced conflicts and lower costs) (Borden Ladner 
Gervais 2016, 1; Stern 2017). Also, fintech firms are different than traditional “move-fast-
9and-break-things” Silicon Valley start-ups, such as Uber, which may use the legal process 
as a tool to solve business problems through strategic litigation or lobbying (Newcomer 
2017). This strategy is unlikely in the financial industry because a fintech firm will 
encounter a powerful regulator with the ability to levy significant fines (Gavin et al. 2018).
In the U.S., in August 2018, Arizona became the first state to launch a sandbox for fintech 
(Finextra 2018). Additional states, such as Illinois, are considering similar initiatives 
(Kearns, Lorentz and Dempewolf 2018). At the federal-agency level, fintech sandboxes 
exist at both the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (LabCFTC) and the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) (Project Catalyst). The Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency (OCC) has also established an Office of Innovation as a central contact 
for initiatives in the national banking sector. Also, the U.S. Treasury report (2018, 
168) emphasized the need for sandboxes. A U.S. national sandbox is constitutionally 
uncertain, and unlike in the U.K., U.S. agencies don’t have a competition-enhancing 
mandate (Reiners 2018). Sandboxes shouldn’t be considered a panacea, however, and 
some officials — including SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce — have cautioned against 
regulators “sitting in the sandbox” with innovators and seeking to influence business 
decisions (Tonkovic 2018).
In Canada, a regulatory sandbox was initiated in 2017 by the Canadian Securities 
Administrators (CSA) as part of its 2016–19 business plan. Firms selected for the sandbox 
can test their products and services with a limited selection of the Canadian market and 
obtain “exemptive relief” from certain securities-law requirements (Canada Securities 
Administrators 2018). The Ontario government has announced its intention to create a 
regulatory “super sandbox” for fintech and launch an agency called the Ontario Fintech 
Accelerator Office to facilitate fintech innovation (Giovannetti 2017). There are also 
currently many private innovation accelerators in Canada, such as the DMZ-BMO Fintech 
Accelerator. Provincial securities commissions — including in Ontario, Quebec and British 
Columbia — have established advisory offices or working groups to support fintech 
growth (Stikeman Elliot 2018). The Alberta Securities Commission (2018) also established 
a “new economy” division focused on “issues and opportunities relating to emerging 
financial technologies.”
IV. FINTECH BANKING
I. FINTECH BANKING AND PARTNERSHIP MODELS
Some fintech firms may want to simply become banks, but this is not an overwhelming 
trend, and it’s more relevant in the U.S. than in Canada (Rastello 2018). The 
complementary idea of integrated partnerships has become more prominent with banks 
using technology to augment existing services (Hannah 2018). Motivating this trend are 
both opportunity (expertise) and regulatory-cost considerations (Tweddle 2018). Another 
concern is that a bank must ensure that it has sufficient customer-data cyber-security 
protection in place and it must incur the cost of due diligence necessary to ensure such 
protection (Mirmazaheri 2016, 178). In becoming a bank, the benefits of low-cost funding 
(deposits) must be weighed against the costs of heightened regulatory scrutiny, the real 
application costs (and time) involved in obtaining a banking charter, and the daunting 
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prospect of competing head to head with established institutions (Walsh 2018). In the 
U.S. there are multiple avenues of banking entry, including national banking charters, a 
new special purpose fintech charter, state charters and industrial loan company charters 
(recently applied for but subsequently withdrawn by fintech-credit company SoFi (Clozel 
2017) and payments-processing company Square (Witkowski 2018)).
II. U.S. FINTECH SPECIAL-PURPOSE BANKING CHARTER
To operate as a bank in the U.S., a fintech needs to secure an appropriate national or 
state charter, which involves a rigorous and costly process. On July 31, 2018 the OCC (a 
prudential regulator) began accepting applications for “national bank charters from non-
depository financial technology (fintech) companies engaged in the business of banking.” 
Under the terms of this special-purpose charter, “(f)intech companies that apply and 
qualify for, and receive, special purpose national bank charters will be supervised like 
similarly situated national banks, to include capital, liquidity, and financial inclusion 
commitments as appropriate”(OCC 2018). The cited benefits of the charter include 
“uniformity” and “transparency,” as well as advancing the banking regulatory framework 
to facilitate innovation and new financial offerings outside of the conventional banking 
scope (Murphy 2017, 407-408). However, the announcement did not spur a rush of 
fintech bank applicants (Clozel 2018). 
The OCC’s fintech charter was initially opposed at the state level as being beyond the 
agency’s jurisdictional authority (Savoie and Hoffman 2018, 511-512). The state of New 
York filed suit on Sept. 14, 2018 against the OCC, citing the fintech charter as both 
outside of the OCC’s jurisdiction and “ill-conceived” (Dolmetsch 2018). New York’s 
opposition to the fintech charter has been criticized since it would stifle an “emerging 
dual fintech system” (Curry and Cabral 2018). Other critics of the OCC’s move cite the 
program’s administrative (and application) burdens as so arduous and the benefits 
so limited (firms are subject to prudential controls including capital and liquidity 
commitments without the benefit of access to the Fed’s payment system) that it won’t be 
used at all (Baker 2018). Also, a fintech wanting to become a bank must obtain approval 
from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC), and early indications from the FDIC 
charter application of mobile-banking company Varo Money (which recently pulled its 
initial FDIC application) show that obtaining FDIC approval won’t be an easy step, if it can 
be obtained at all (Burns 2018).
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN CANADIAN FINTECH BANKING
The Canadian banking sector is dominated by a relatively few large national firms. The 
industry has high barriers to entry due to the significant transaction costs involved in 
switching banks, the constant addition of “features” that the big banks are providing, the 
difficulties for an upstart in obtaining a banking charter, and the significant reputational 
advantages of the big banks (Carmichael 2018). As a result, many don’t see fintech as a 
significant threat to Canadian banks — and this has been a source of concern for those 
advocating for greater fintech growth and banking competition in Canada (Carmichael 
2018). Further, Canada has been criticized for being “woefully unprepared” for the 
fintech-innovation wave that is happening (King 2018). Currently, fintech is not a wide 
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threat to Canadian banking incumbents, but the major banks are launching their own 
research and development into fintech projects, including in “(b)lockchain technology, 
big data, automated advice and payments services” (Chan 2017). Also, Canadian banks 
are increasingly looking to partner or acquire fintech firms (Zochodne 2018). The recent 
entrance into the Canadian banking sector of new charters, who are focused on building 
market share by pursuing under-banked customers and using innovations in the digital 
space show that the incumbent big banks cannot become complacent in their products 
or service offerings (Ligaya 2017). 
V. CRYPTOCURRENCY AND INITIAL COIN OFFERINGS
I. CRYPTOCURRENCY: DEFINITIONAL IMPLICATIONS AND CHALLENGES
The terms blockchain, Bitcoin and cryptocurrency have become common in the financial 
press; however, many people don’t understand what they are, or the purpose they serve. 
One definition of blockchain is a “digitized, decentralized, public ledger” comprised 
of various distributed “nodes” or networked computers (Investopedia 2019). Private 
(permissioned) blockchains are also used as enterprise solutions (O’Connell 2016). 
Blocks on the blockchain are recent transactions (verified or “mined,” time-stamped 
and authenticated through cryptography and linked to the previous block) and added 
in chronological order, which, once proven, are provided to each node as an “indelible” 
(permanent) digital transaction record (O’Connell 2016). Miners are provided with 
a cryptocurrency as a reward (Goodman and Partridge 2018, 2). Benefits of using a 
blockchain include no central authority (since trust in a transaction is ensured through 
cryptography and not a third party), an encrypted, secured ledger, transparency, 
faster and more efficient transactions and settlements, “user controlled” networks, and 
reduced transaction costs. However, concerns such as return on investment and energy-
consumption costs exist (Williams 2017). There are also lingering uncertainties about 
transaction-settlement speed (Marr 2018).
The first major implementation of blockchain was Bitcoin (Kharpal 2018). Bitcoin was 
conceived in the release of an anonymous white paper in 2008, from a mysterious 
“Satoshi Nakamoto” (whose actual identity has yet to be determined), as a decentralized 
“peer-to-peer version of electronic cash” or “cryptocurrency,” which allows for payments 
to be made between parties outside of banking intermediaries or governments 
(Nakamoto 2008). Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies solve the “double spend” problem 
using a blockchain (rather than a central authority) and any transaction, once proven 
through cryptography, is broadcast to the entire network as part of an indelible record 
(Cointelegraph 2018). Bitcoin experienced a wild price run (and fall) from late 2017 to 
early 2018 due to, among other factors, increased speculation, general technological 
curiosity, its use as a digital hedge for unstable currencies, and demand from the ICO 
market (Clements 2018). Since its inception, Bitcoin has also been used extensively in 
conjunction with criminal enterprise, money laundering, hacking and cyber-fraud. It 
has been recently reported, however, that legal use is now exceeding criminal usage 
(Kuskowski 2018).
12
Another popular cryptocurrency is Ethereum, a concept that envisions a decentralized 
internet (Kuskowski 2018). The Ethereum network is like a decentralized “world 
computer” (proprietary servers are replaced by volunteer nodes on the network) 
and applications on the network are powered by miners (volunteers who solve the 
cryptographic puzzles on the Ethereum blockchain) who are rewarded with the 
cryptocurrency Ether, which can be used as payment for applications, or exist as a 
standalone digital fiat (Kuskowski 2018). With Ethereum, you can use applications 
without third-party hosting or fees (Kuskowski 2018). Other popular cryptocurrencies 
include Bitcoin Cash (created by effectively a share split of Bitcoin, that has faster 
processing speeds to facilitate smaller payments), Litecoin (a competitor to Bitcoin as a 
form of digital money), and Ripple, a cryptocurrency that’s used for interbank transfers 
(Reynard 2018).
Digital cryptocurrency faces significant hurdles in replacing conventional government-
backed currency. On the practical side, at least currently, there are high transaction 
costs, fees and delays in using Bitcoin as payment (as opposed to nearly none with cash) 
and many vendors simply won’t accept it given its volatility (Brown 2017). Bitcoin has a 
limited number of “coins” (21 million, once all coins are mined by 2140) and because of 
the high energy costs of maintaining the network, it may not be profitable for miners to 
keep the network going (Elnaj 2018). There are recurring questions about Bitcoin’s ability 
to fulfill the threefold purpose of money, particularly in storing value (volatility) and 
serving as a medium of exchange (lack of vendor acceptance) (Elnaj 2018). Nevertheless, 
some people living under unstable government regimes consider it as a gold-like hedge 
against their own domestic currency volatility (Linuma 2018). Also, as recently noted in a 
speech by Bank of Canada Deputy Governor Timothy Lane (2018), the “pre-programmed 
monetary policy mechanism” of a defined supply of Bitcoin (thus eliminating the need for 
central authority) may actually have been a “fundamental flaw” in its price stability (and 
use as a currency substitute), since the limited supply was not able to keep up with large 
demand in late 2017.
As it currently stands, global regulators are quickly adapting to the reality of Bitcoin 
as a currency substitute (Rooney 2018). In the U.S., the Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network (FinCEN, a department of the U.S. Treasury) has stated on its website 
(March 18, 2013) that virtual currency, although acting as a currency substitute, is not 
legal tender. This ruling is consistent with the approach in Canada where the federal 
government has noted on its website (2019) that only the Canadian dollar is legal tender. 
Another challenge in regulating cryptocurrency is that its legal definition has been 
interpreted in multiple ways, leading to regulatory uncertainty (and confusion). The 
CFTC (2018), the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Meyer 2018), 
and most recently the U.S. District Court or Massachusetts (Marinoff 2018), have stated 
that cryptocurrencies, including Bitcoin, are commodities. The SEC, in its DAO ruling 
(2017), found that cryptocurrencies can (sometimes) be securities (Roberts 2017). The 
U.S. Internal Revenue Service (2014) has interpreted cryptocurrency in Notice 2014-
21 as property for the purposes of tax assessment and as a result they are subject to 
reportable capital gains and losses, even when used as a payment mechanism.
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II. CRYPTOCURRENCY EXCHANGES, FUNDS AND MANAGED PRODUCTS
Bitcoin’s wild price run in 2017 caused the public and regulators to take notice of 
cryptocurrency (Verhage 2017). Cryptocurrency exchanges can be (and often are) a 
frustrating mix of price volatility, trading-price discrepancies, uncertainty, and delays. 
These venues are also rife with allegations of price manipulation and serving as a haven 
for criminal enterprise. Such allegations are now empirically supported by research 
identifying the use of the digital currency Tether on the Bitfinex exchange to manipulate 
Bitcoin prices during the 2017 price run (Griffin and Shams 2018). Also, recent reports 
point to widespread fraud and “fake trading volume” in unregulated exchanges 
throughout the world (Vigna 2019).
Regulation that enables standardized, transparent and safe crypto-asset-trading venues 
is critical (Bambrough 2018). A recent Financial Action Task Force report gives some 
hope for enhanced exchange standards (Wada 2018). This is especially important given 
the recent report published by the New York Attorney General’s Office (2018) noting 
a strong risk of manipulation on unsupervised cryptocurrency exchanges, and the lack 
of safeguards, and market surveillance and enforcement capabilities consistent with 
those of traditional securities exchanges. Unfortunately, many venues are operating 
without oversight, failing to properly register in the U.S. as a regulated national securities 
exchange or alternate trading system, or in Canada as a marketplace (Goodman and 
Partridge 2018, 7) or self-report (Rooney 2018). Also, some cryptocurrency platforms 
may offer services related to an exchange (such as a digital wallet with sales capabilities) 
and thus may trigger other regulatory obligations relating to dealer functions, brokerage, 
money transmission or clearing (Schroeder 2018). 
In the U.S., given their various functions, cryptocurrency exchanges could be subject to 
oversight by FinCEN for being exchanges involved in money transmission (and subject 
to regulations regarding terrorist financing, money laundering and financial crime). 
They could be subject to oversight by the SEC, since some coin offerings are securities 
offerings. They could be subject to oversight by the CFTC, since this agency considers 
cryptocurrencies to be commodities. They could be subject to oversight by the Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) with respect to marketing activities on a state 
basis in relation to money-transmission rules, consumer-protection legislation, anti-
money-laundering and various other requirements. And, if they operate in New York, they 
could be subject to oversight by the Department of Financial Services “Bitlicense” regime 
(Myers Wood 2018). In 2017 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Law (also known as the Uniform Law Commission) released a Uniform Regulation of 
Virtual Currency Businesses Act, but it has yet to be enacted on an individual state level 
(Thompson Coburn 2018).
In Canada, the regulatory status of cryptocurrency exchanges is a live public-policy 
issue due to the recent failure of QuadrigaCX and its $190 million in lost cryptocurrency 
(Copeland 2019). QuadrigaCX’s insolvency resulted in a consultation paper (CP 21-402) 
being issued by the CSA (2019) on a proposed regulatory framework for crypto-asset 
trading platforms. The ultimate structure of this regulatory regime is uncertain, as is 
the ability of securities regulators to even assert jurisdiction over spot trading in certain 
crypto-assets, such as Bitcoin or Ether, that are widely distributed yet not considered 
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to be securities. A cryptocurrency company or exchange may also be subject to a 
myriad of additional rules, including oversight by the Financial Transactions and Reports 
Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) with respect to fraud, terrorist financing and 
money laundering and by the Department of Justice, as well as being subject to various 
consumer and money-transmission regulations (Goodman and Partridge 2018, 11-13).
Another timely concern is the managed and exchange-traded-fund (ETF) sector. With 
respect to ETFs, the SEC rejected an application (originally filed in 2016, but rejected by 
the SEC on appeal) by Bats Exchange to list shares of the Winklevoss Bitcoin Trust and 
has delayed its decision on the VanEck SolidX Bitcoin Trust (Alexandre 2018). In 2018, 
the SEC also rejected several ETF applications citing price volatility and concerns about 
the potential for fraud and manipulation in the Bitcoin futures market and underlying 
spot markets; the rejections are currently under review (Chang 2018). The SEC isn’t 
unanimous in its disapproval of a Bitcoin ETF. SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce (who 
dissented on the Winklevoss Bitcoin Trust) has criticized the decision, a move that has 
earned her the nickname “crypto mom” by Bitcoin enthusiasts online (Peirce 2018). The 
SEC also recently halted trading on two cryptocurrency products — Bitcoin Tracker One 
and Ether Tracker One, which were marketed as both ETFs and exchange-traded notes 
— citing “market confusion” (Hunnicutt 2018). Despite the SEC’s reluctance to bless 
cryptocurrency ETFs, there are many actively managed cryptocurrency hedge funds in 
the U.S., offering investors a variety of exposure (Russo 2018). 
A recent report estimated that nearly 100 new crypto-hedge funds were opened in the 
U.S. in 2018, down from over 150 in 2017 (Cryptofund Research 2018). These funds are 
attracting major institutional capital, including a recent investment from Yale University 
(Marsh and Katz 2018). The SEC has, however, been active in its enforcement actions for 
crypto-hedge funds that violate securities laws, including launching several cease-and-
desist orders and fines (Rooney 2018). Underscoring these kinds of concerns, a “Bitcoin 
Investment Trust” (the Grayscale Bitcoin Investment Trust) recently lost over 80 per 
cent of its value since December 2017 and has been criticized for its steep fee structure 
(Bambrough 2018).
Canada also has actively managed cryptocurrency funds to supplement a healthy and 
growing blockchain ETF market (Sakovich 2018). A Bitcoin ETF (the Evolve Bitcoin ETF) 
has been filed but is awaiting regulatory approval (McGlone 2018). The Rivemont Crypto 
Fund, a mutual fund, launched in December 2017 and is restricted to only investing in six 
cryptocurrencies: Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, Ripple, Bitcoin Cash and Ethereum Classic 
(Owram 2018). First Block Capital also has a Bitcoin fund (the FBC Bitcoin Trust) that is 
only available to accredited investors (“Canada’s First” 2018). First Block was granted, in 
September 2017, registration by the B.C. Securities Commission as an investment fund 
manager and exempt market dealer, the first such registration for a fund dedicated only 
to cryptocurrency (BCSC 2017).
III. REGULATING CRYPTOCURRENCY DERIVATIVES
In the summer of 2017, the CFTC granted registration to New York-based LedgerX as a 
derivatives-clearing organization and swap-execution facility to provide clearing services 
for Bitcoin options (puts and calls) and for fully collateralized day-ahead swaps. Further, 
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in late 2017, Bitcoin futures started trading on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and 
the CBOE Futures Exchange, and Bitcoin binary options began trading on the Cantor 
Exchange, under the exchange’s “self-certification” process where the derivatives 
contracts were deemed to meet the exchange’s internal risk-oversight requirements 
(CFTC 2017). The CFTC (2018) also recently released guidance to clearinghouses and 
exchanges planning on listing cryptocurrency derivatives through a joint advisory 
from the agency’s Division of Market Oversight and Division of Clearing and Risk to aid 
exchanges to “design risk management programs that address the new risks” imposed 
by virtual-currency products and also ensure “appropriate governance processes.” This 
guidance is especially relevant in light of the expanding derivatives-listing horizon that 
is likely to also shortly include options on Ether (CCN 2018) and plans from major Wall 
Street institutions for cryptocurrency-derivative products, including Morgan Stanley for 
Bitcoin swap trading and Goldman Sachs for Bitcoin non-deliverable forward contracts 
(Franck 2018).
In Canada, regulators have taken a guidance-based, cautious approach. Statements 
by the CSA (2017) identified “inherent risks associated with cryptocurrency futures“ 
due to their trading on largely unregulated cryptocurrency venues. Also, the Canadian 
investment industry’s self-regulatory organization, the Investment Industry Regulatory 
Organization of Canada (IIROC), in late 2017, pursuant to Rule Notice 17-0238, 
established “minimum margin requirements for cryptocurrency futures contracts.” Also, 
pursuant to Multilateral Instrument 91-102 (which has been adopted widely by provincial 
securities regulators), binary options with a “term to maturity of less than 30 days with 
or to an individual, or to a person or company that was created or is used solely to 
trade a binary option” are prohibited (Borden Ladner Gervais 2016). A binary option is a 
“derivative product with a fixed (or maximum) payout if the option expires in the money, 
or the trader loses the amount they invested in the option if the option expires out of the 
money” (Chen 2018). Binary options are relevant in a cryptocurrency context because, 
in the U.S., the Cantor Exchange, in December 2017, self-certified a Bitcoin binary-option 
product (CFTC 2017). Therefore, Multilateral Instrument 91-102 provides an example of 
a regulatory distinction between Canada and the U.S. with respect to the permissive 
treatment by the latter of a wider variety of cryptocurrency options.
IV. REGULATING INITIAL COIN OFFERINGS (ICOS)
In an ICO, a technology company raises money either “pre-release,” to fund a project, 
or “post-release,” to raise new funds for an ongoing project (McCann 2017), by selling 
its own cryptocurrency called “tokens” (Dudgeon and Malna 2018, 6-7). These are 
often used on the application or website that the company is creating (Popper 2017). 
In addition to use-based tokens, ICOs may also issue private cryptocurrencies (such 
as Bitcoin), create tokens with an ownership interest in a specific asset, such as real 
estate, or represent an ownership interest such as a security (Dale 2018). Filecoin, which 
describes itself on its website as a “decentralized storage network,” raised US$257 million 
in an ICO during August-September 2017 (Higgins 2017). Often in an ICO, purchasers will 
buy the tokens by exchanging a popular cryptocurrency (such as Bitcoin or Ether) for the 
new token (Popper 2018). 
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Where ICOs have attracted regulatory attention is when the token that is being offered 
seems like more than just a “utility,” and it starts to resemble an investment contract 
or security (CSA Staff Notice 46-308 2018). The use of the term “utility” in the context 
of an ICO is commonly associated with a type of offering that provides a specific use-
right to a product or service of the issuer. This can be contrasted with a “security” 
token, which provides a holder “a bundle of rights to govern the corporation, along with 
residual claims on its assets proportional to the number of shares they own” (Cohney et 
al. forthcoming, 8). If an ICO is an offering of securities then it will be subject to a wide 
host of securities registration, disclosure (initial and continuous), and resale restrictions 
pursuant to its offering jurisdiction and where investors are based (CSA Staff Notice 46-
307 2017). An error in judgement on the type of token that is being offered can be very 
costly for issuers, as evidenced by Operation Cryptosweep, a co-ordinated cross-border 
regulatory effort to crack down on illegal ICO offerings (NASAA 2018).
Perhaps the most important ruling in the regulatory evolution of ICOs in the U.S. was 
the SEC’s (2017) investigative report of the DAO offering, which deemed an offering 
of profit-participation tokens to be an “investment contract” and subject to federal 
securities regulation. The SEC’s ruling left unanswered the security status of tokens with 
a standalone utility. It is an important ruling when considering cryptocurrency offerings 
that will be subject to U.S. securities laws. In arriving at its conclusion on the DAO, the 
SEC applied the test for securities determination from Howey (1946), as well as other 
jurisprudence (Edwards 2004; United Housing Fund 1975; Tcherepnin 1967) to determine 
that the DAO tokens were “an investment of money in a common enterprise with a 
reasonable expectation of profits derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts 
of others” and thus subject to securities laws (Howey 1946).
Shortly after the DAO ruling, the CSA advised that crypto-token offerings resembling the 
DAO offering were “likely” to be securities in Canada and subject to regulatory oversight 
(Roberts 2017). The Ontario Securities Commission (2017) also released an advisory note 
for companies utilizing distributed ledger technology on potential securities implications, 
and the British Columbia Securities Commission (2018) released BC Notice 2018/1 “Notice 
and Request for Comment — Consulting on the Securities Law framework for Fintech.” 
The CSA further issued CSA Staff Notice 46-307 on Aug. 24, 2017 relating to ICOs and 
identified risks in these offerings (including volatility, opacity, valuation, and custody) and 
noted that offered tokens are frequently traded on unregulated online exchanges. Staff 
Notice 46-307 applied the following guidance, based on the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
decision in Pacific Coast Coin (1977), on whether an ICO would be an investment contract 
(and subject to securities regulation): “does the ICO/ITO involve: 1) an investment of 
money; 2) in a common enterprise; 3) with the expectation of profit; to come significantly 
from the efforts of others.” (CSA Staff Notice 46-307 2017, 3)
In October 2017, TokenFunder Inc. (a platform facilitating venture funding for other 
technology startups and digital-currency companies) had its ICO approved by the 
Ontario Securities Commission for distribution to retail investors (Stikeman Elliot 
2018). Another notable Canadian ICO development was with Waterloo, Ont.-based Kik 
Interactive, which excluded Canadians from participation in its “Kin” token as a result 
of concerns that it would be deemed a security by the Ontario Securities Commission 
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(Goodman and Partridge 2018, 5). A document called a “Simple Agreement For Future 
Token” (SAFT) has also been recently developed by cryptocurrency professionals to 
reduce ambiguity in this area (Goodman and Partridge 2017). This document works by 
“bifurcating the securities and token components of a transaction while preserving the 
many benefits associated with ICOs” and keeping the utility component (the “functional 
token” not as likely to be a security) separate from the security-like component (the 
“non-functional token”) (Goodman and Partridge 2017). While more common in the 
U.S., the SAFT is not used much in Canada and each ICO must be analyzed for securities 
classification on its own (Goodman and Partridge 2017).
VI. FINTECH CREDIT AND MARKETPLACE LENDING
I. INTRODUCTION TO MARKET STRUCTURES AND BUSINESS MODELS
Fintech credit (also called marketplace, online or peer-to-peer lending), like all fintech 
propositions, poses opportunity, such as more credit and enhanced deployment 
speed, and new risks, such as regulatory-supervisory difficulty (Lenz 2016). The 
business structures in peer-to-peer (P2P) lending vary, but as the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) (2017, 11) notes in its comprehensive report on fintech credit, they all 
generally revolve around a common theme: connecting borrowers with potential lenders 
through an online portal. Under a “traditional” P2P lending model, borrowers provide 
credit information to the platform, which undertakes risk analysis often using non-
traditional credit-scoring metrics (Mavadiya 2018). The BIS report (2017, 11) identifies that 
lenders then choose which loans to fund and the loan contracting, disbursement of funds, 
and repayment takes place through the portal. Within the ambit of the traditional model 
is a “matching” variety where investors provide risk and duration parameters and are 
only shown potential loans that meet these criteria. Lenders often fund multiple loans to 
diversify risk, called “auto-select” loans (BIS 2017, 11-14). The terms of the loan (including 
prepayment penalties or privileges) will vary based on the investor and the platform (BIS 
2017, 12).
The BIS report (2017, 11-16) also identifies a variety of business models for P2P lending, 
including a “notary model,” which provides a matching service with the loan originating 
from a partnering bank (popular in Germany, South Korea and the U.S.) and the borrower 
provides credit data to the platform, which is shared with the investor and the partnering 
bank (which undertakes its own risk assessment). The model also facilitates securitization 
when loans are repackaged and sold to investors (BIS 2017, 12). Additional models noted 
in the report are a “guaranteed return” form, where the online platform promises a return 
of principle and/or interest to investors in exchange for a guarantee fee paid by the 
borrower (common in China); and a “balance sheet” model, where the online platform 
originates a loan (from retail or institutional investors) and the platform then holds the 
loan on its balance sheet, acting as a credit intermediary, a model often used in the U.K. 
to facilitate real estate loans (BIS 2017, 11-16). Also starting to appear are “invoice-trading 
models,” where fintech firms offer factoring services (unsecured finance to manage cash 
flows) and there is potential for securitization through this model as well (BIS 2017, 16). 
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II. U.S. FINTECH-CREDIT REGULATORY OVERVIEW
Fintech credit introduces new risks, including data breaches, operational risk, and moral 
hazard (BIS 2017, 11-16). This sector requires inter-agency jurisdictional co-ordination 
to effectively mitigate the risks inherent in new credit extension while ensuring the 
benefits that this new credit could bring to households, businesses and the economy 
(Saul and Curie 2018, 15). The U.S. Treasury report (2018, 11-12) recommended removing 
industry-growth barriers and codifying, by law, the “valid when made” doctrine, which 
would ensure banks are the “true lender” of loans they make (necessary in light of 
recent jurisprudence for banks that partner with fintech firms and transfer loans to them 
(Lo 2016)). The Treasury report (2018, 11-12) also recommends: ensuring mortgage-
lending rules are adapted to facilitate the extension of credit by non-bank financial 
firms; enabling the greater testing of fintech “new credit models and data” to facilitate 
wider credit access; and that “both federal and state banking regulators take steps 
to encourage prudent and sustainable short-term small-dollar instalment lending by 
banks.” An example is rescinding the CFPB’s “payday” rule” that applies to fintech short-
term, small-amount lenders. Also, the CFPB has shown a willingness through its Project 
Catalyst initiative, and the use of no-action letters to work with fintech lenders to ensure 
fair access to credit and non-discriminatory lending practices (Bruckner 2018, 58-59).
III. CANADIAN FINTECH-CREDIT REGULATORY OVERVIEW
The appetite for marketplace lending and fintech credit in Canada is rising. Canadian 
securities regulators take the position that P2P loans can be securities and fintech-
credit companies may be dealers with registration and disclosure implications, unless 
they can utilize a suitable exemption (Lalonde 2017). The first online, peer-to-peer 
lending platform in Canada was Lending Loop. Lending Loop launched in 2015 and 
as of spring 2018 had funded over $20 million worth of loans from more than 20,000 
Canadian investors (Asano and King, 2018). Recently, the Ontario government proposed 
a $3-million contribution, over two years, to loans originating through Lending Loop 
(Asano and King 2018). Nevertheless, there are calls for Canadian regulators to do more. 
Recent research on the Canadian loan market for small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) has noted a funding “gap” that could be filled by new, non-bank, fintech-credit 
companies (Hinton et al. 2017). Others have called on Canadian regulators to establish 
new marketplace lending regulations (as opposed to “shoehorning this sector under 
existing equity regulation”); raise retail limits for online lending; partner with industry to 
“provide more education for investors and small businesses”; and adopt a “mandatory 
referral program” (like that in the U.K.) where banks who reject credit applicants must 
refer potential borrowers to “alternative lenders” (Asano and King 2018). 
The Competition Bureau (2017, 6, 47-48) suggests that Canadians might distrust non-
bank fintech-lending platforms and this could serve as a deterrent for non-bank entrant 
growth; also that a fragmented regulatory structure governing new, non-bank, fintech-
credit firms that aren’t subject to OSFI oversight can be a significant cost and entry 
barrier for new firms. Potential regulatory oversight includes “money-services businesses” 
rules, securities jurisdiction and FINTRAC obligations (Stikeman Elliot 2018). For example, 
a fintech-credit company in Canada could be in the “business of trading” and subject to 
“dealer registration and platform-related recognition requirements” (albeit with suitable 
exemptions) under various provincial securities acts (Stikeman Elliot 2018).
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VII.  FINTECH PAYMENTS, ROBO-ADVISERS AND FINANCIAL-
ACCOUNT AGGREGATORS
I. REGULATING FINTECH-PAYMENTS INNOVATIONS
The fintech-payments sector has a variety of potential consumer and business-to-
business applications directed at widening the scope and enhancing the speed of 
available money-transfer and payment options (Bradbury 2017). A global example of 
fintech-payments success is M-Pesa, a phone-based money-transfer system growing 
rapidly in Africa. This sector is prime for bank partnerships, since tech firms can supply 
the technology and banks have customers and risk-management safeguards (Bradbury 
2017). Payments innovations may also potentially reduce income inequality, as “real-
time payments” could dramatically reduce the fees (estimated in the U.S. in the billions) 
that many low-income individuals face when relying on cheque-cashing services, 
payday lenders and bank overdraft services (Klein 2019). At the heart of the payment 
revolution is a desire to enhance the delivery speed, efficiency, convenience and 
diversity of available currencies, while reducing the cost of international and domestic 
financial transfers (Roser and Kang 2016, 651). Blockchain-payment innovations also 
provide value when local individuals or merchants stop trusting intermediaries (“Panel 
on Fintech” 2018). One prominent fintech-payments company is Ripple, which promised 
on its website on Feb. 25, 2019 a “frictionless experience to send money globally using 
the power of blockchain.” Others include Venmo, as well as Zelle, an application owned 
by a group of large U.S. banks (Perez 2018). A Canadian-based startup, Finn.ai, has 
collaborated with both ATB Financial and BMO to facilitate payments from bank accounts 
from Facebook Messenger, and TD Bank has partnered with Kasisto to integrate artificial-
intelligence chat into its mobile application (Ligaya 2018).
The payments sector in the U.S. is both “operationally complex” and regulatorily 
“fragmented” and new firms must navigate a large host of “bank agencies’ third-party 
oversight guidance,” “state money transmitter statutes” and potential “private payment 
network operating rules and contracts” as well as consumer protection rules from the 
CFPB and the Federal Trade Commission (U.S. Treasury Department 2018, 145). In 
May 2015, the Faster Payments Task Force was convened by the U.S. Federal Reserve 
to provide in-depth analysis on how payments could be improved without significant 
risks. The task-force project concluded in two phases. First, with a detailed report of its 
approach (FPTFa 2017), and then with recommendations including improvements to 
regulatory frameworks and technological infrastructure (FPTFb 2017). The U.S. Treasury 
report (2018, 13, 147, 156) also made numerous recommendations for enhancing payment 
systems within a risk-contained network, including regulatory clarity, ”harmonizing 
money transmitter requirements for licensing and supervisory expectations,” continuing 
with the approach of the Faster Payments Task Force, and setting new public goals and 
deadlines to improve payments with an emphasis on retail applications and accessibility 
for small community banks and credit unions. 
In Canada, the minister of finance supervises Payments Canada, which notes on its 
website it “is responsible for Canada’s essential payments systems,” and the Bank of 
Canada “regulates clearing and settlement systems and controls systemic or payments 
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system risk” (Goodman and Partridge 2018, 13). Both entities, along with several 
private interests, recently embarked on the collaborative Project Jasper to research 
how blockchain technology could be used to improve wholesale payments, and in May 
2018, the project’s third phase announced proof of concept for “instantaneous clearing 
and settlement of securities” using blockchain technology (Bank of Canada 2019). The 
Department of Finance, in July 2017, also released a consultation paper called “A New 
Retail Payments Oversight Framework” proposing a federal oversight structure for retail 
payments. The oversight framework defined a wide scope of “payment service providers” 
(PSPs), including credit card, online payments, and peer-to-peer money transferors, which 
would have register as a “designated federal retail payments regulator” and these PSPs 
would have to adhere to a host of funding-safeguard measures, operational and privacy 
standards and disclosure requirements, and also submit to dispute-resolution mechanisms 
with potential liability for unauthorized transactions (McCarthy Tetrault 2017).
In its 2018 budget, the federal government of Canada noted the importance of fast 
and safe retail payments systems, and committed to consultation with stakeholders, 
including the provinces and territories, as well as a review of the Canadian Payments 
Act (Canada 2018). An area of identified concern as a potential barrier to new fintech 
entrants is access to data, which is needed for new market entrants to test technology 
(Hinton et al. 2017, 5). In Canada, fintech-payment companies also need to comply with 
applicable FINTRAC requirements (as money-services businesses), criminal law rules, or 
other privacy and consumer protection standards that apply (Competition Bureau 2017, 
48). Also, in 2014, the Anti-Money Laundering Act was amended for money-services 
businesses dealing in digital currencies, but the changes are not currently in force as 
regulations are pending (Stikeman Elliot 2018). 
Nevertheless, as noted by the Competition Bureau (2017, 5), “a strong governance 
framework is needed to prevent incumbent members and early entrants from strategically 
developing rules that exclude others from entering this sector in the future.” This concern is 
particularly relevant in retail payments, since most new market entrants are within an intra-
network or downstream payments ecosystem and payments innovators, such as electronic 
wallets or retail-payment or money-transfer applications, are “inserting themselves 
between the deposit taking institution and the payment making customer” (Competition 
Bureau 2017, 23-26, 31). Thus new market entrants, according to the Competition Bureau 
(2017, 31), rely on an incumbent’s access to core payment infrastructure (such as the 
Automated Clearing Settlement System) to operate. However, an incumbent is competing 
for the same customers, so it has an incentive to refuse to service a new fintech-payments 
firm that requires access — and this dynamic is exacerbated by a large institution’s 
regulatory “de-risking” activities (Competition Bureau 2017, 31). To encourage greater 
competition and innovation in payments, the Competition Bureau (2017, 40) recommends 
fostering more fintech and bank collaboration to provide core infrastructure access and 
regulatory approval to permit merchants to “make use of their ability to use discounts or 
other incentives to encourage adoption of alternative or lower-cost payment methods” and 
to foster “greater awareness of product and service options.”
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II. REGULATING ROBO-ADVISERS: ALGORITHMIC WEALTH MANAGEMENT
Another fintech innovation challenging regulatory paradigms are algorithmic wealth 
management platforms, popularly called robo-advisers. These provide investment 
recommendations and portfolio-management services to clients using data obtained 
from detailed questionnaires, such as age, risk tolerance and financial goals (Iannarone 
2018). There are many potential benefits of robo-advisers, such as professional wealth-
management advice for clients who, because of remote locations or a lack of net 
worth, are unable to obtain such services, and platforms operate in conjunction with 
human oversight and in hybrid models (Lightbourne 2017, 652-653). Robo-advisers 
present both “promise” and “pitfalls” (D’Acunto et al. 2018). Positively, their automatic 
functioning can enhance household savings and serve as an antidote to a potential 
“retirement savings crisis” (Edwards 2018). One recent study identified robo-advisers 
as enhancing performance and effectively rebalancing under-diversified investment 
portfolios, as well as remedying common investing behavioural biases and heuristics for 
all classes of investors (D’Acunto et al. 2018, 3). There are many other potential benefits 
of robo-adviser platforms, including lower fees, reduced conflicts of interest, increased 
transparency, and increased investment quality (Baker and Dellaert 2018, 713, 734-735).
There are, however, drawbacks to using them, such as less diversification for previously 
diversified investors after the imposition of a robo-advising “optimizer” platform 
(D’Acunto et al 2018, 3). Robo-advisers have fiduciary implications and there is 
uncertainty on the assignment of liability when an algorithm fails to adhere to a fiduciary 
standard (Lightbourne 2017, 678-79). There are also new risks, and regulatory challenges 
like matching algorithms to clients to ensure suitable product choices, managing cyber-
security threats, data-protection and -management concerns including access and data 
quality, and scale — if a wide section of the consumer market is affected by a similar 
error, this could have systemic implications (Baker and Dellaert 2018, 734-35, 737-39, 
742-744). There is also uncertainty if robo-advisory platforms will ever fully supplant 
traditional investment advisers (Litz 2018).
Digital wealth management in the U.S. is subject to a variety of regulators and 
overlapping rules (U.S. Treasury Department 2018, 162). Potential supervisors include 
the SEC and state securities regulators, FINRA for investment recommendations, state 
insurance regulators for insurance services, federal retirement guidelines for financial 
planning, federal and state consumer protection laws, as well as a myriad of potential 
banking, accounting, Department of Labor (for fiduciary obligations), and tax rules. 
There are also potential industry self-regulatory and conflict-of-interest guidelines (U.S. 
Treasury Department 2018, 162-63). The U.S. Treasury report (2018, 164) also expressed 
concerns that regulatory fragmentation is costly to this sector, and it “discourages 
the provision of integrated investment advice for assets held in retirement and non-
retirement accounts”; therefore it recommended a “primary regulator” structure 
(likely the SEC or a state securities regulator). Also, the SEC (2019) recently fined 
two automated robo-adviser platforms, Wealthfront and Hedgeable, for making false 
statements and providing “misleading advertising.”
There are many robo-advisory platforms in Canada including Wealthsimple, WealthBar, 
Justwealth, and Nest Wealth (Aston 2018). A robo-adviser in Canada could be subject to a 
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diverse range of provincial and federal regulations, including provincial securities oversight 
and harmonized guidance through the CSA, federal criminal law, anti-money-laundering 
and fraud rules, federal and provincial consumer-protection legislation and governance 
through the banking prudential regulator OSFI. There is also industry self-regulation from 
IIROC with respect to “suitability” and “know-your-client” recommendations, which can 
be difficult to obtain in the context of robo-advisers (Competition Bureau 2017, 7, 18-19). 
The CSA issued Staff Notice 31-342 “Guidance for Portfolio Managers Regarding Online 
Advice” in 2015 noting the application of securities laws to robo-advisers, including know-
your-client obligations and potential due diligence and portfolio composition reviews by 
CSA staff for online platforms (Stikeman Elliot 2018). The staff notice makes the regulation 
of online advisers in Canada more “strenuous” than in the U.S., implying that traditional 
wealth management will still be in the picture for a while, with robo-adviser technology 
providing support-like tools in a “hybrid” model (McCarthy Tetrault 2018). Further, the 
CSA ensures that online advisers in Canada adhere to securities laws by requiring “custom 
terms and conditions,” such as restrictions on margin, leverage or selling short (McCarthy 
Tetrault 2018). In addition, IIROC (2018) has issued Notice 18-0076, relating to “order-
execution only” (OEO) services by dealer members, generally prohibiting OEOs from 
providing investment recommendations, while providing guidance on how to adhere to 
OEO regulatory requirements.
III. REGULATING FINANCIAL-ACCOUNT AGGREGATORS
A final fintech innovation with significant disruptive potential is financial-account 
aggregators (“FAA”). FAAs operate in an “open-banking” paradigm with shared 
customer data among banks, centrally accessible by customers through a technology 
platform (called an “application programming interface” or API) that usually runs on 
a smartphone, and this framework could lower the costs and improve the efficiency 
of retail banking services, such as transferring funds between banks and comparing 
competing products (Investopedia 2018). The risks of aggregators are similar to 
other fintech risks: cyber-security, data breaches, financial fraud, and recovery (from 
unauthorized transactions). Financial-account aggregators are predicted to gain 
prominence in a “post-open-banking environment” where they will “sit on top of financial 
account data feeds and provide a place where customers can suck in all their data from 
the different financial institutions they deal with,” yet the ability to achieve this result 
is largely contingent on new advancements in artificial intelligence (Crosman 2018). In 
the U.S., FINRA has identified consumer risks of potential data breaches because of 
account aggregators (Crosman 2018). In Canada, the 2018 federal budget included a 
specific undertaking to “review the merits of open banking in order to assess whether 
open banking would deliver positive results for Canadians with the highest regards for 
consumer privacy, data security and financial stability.”
VIII. CONCLUSION AND EMERGING ISSUES
This article will conclude by identifying some of the key areas where continuing research 
is warranted. Despite its initial hype, large-scale blockchain implementation is not 
widespread (Ross 2017). Several blockchain projects are moving their way through proof 
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of concept, but return on investment, interoperability, and operational functionality 
continue to be concerns (Crosman 2018). The U.S. swap-data repository Depository 
Trust and Clearing Organization (DTCC), blockchain developer Axoni, financial-services-
software firm R3 and IBM announced in early 2017 a blockchain-for-trade settlement 
and back-end processing for certain types of credit derivatives (Lielacher 2017). There 
are also projects contemplating blockchain in syndicated loans (Irrera 2017), securities 
trading (Hansen 2018) agricultural commodities and private equity deals (Crosman 2018); 
and, as previously noted, payments (Project Jasper through Payments Canada and the 
Bank of Canada). 
Meanwhile, a project between DTCC and BNP Paribas SA relating to repo netting has 
been shelved due to uncertain cost and investment returns (Irrera and McCrank 2018). 
As blockchain technology, and smart contracts improve language interoperability 
(the extent that different blockchain networks can interact with each other through 
standardized coding languages, protocols and processes (Brown 2018)) and become 
more mainstream, there are also regulatory uncertainties such as the legal status (for the 
purposes of taxation) of “decentralized autonomous organizations” or entities that exist 
on a blockchain (Shakow 2018). Also unknown is the extent that blockchain applications 
will introduce new systemic risks into the financial system (Surujnath 2017).
As fintechs disrupt traditional banking and financial services, there are increasing calls 
for prudential and market-conduct supervisors to integrate technology, machine learning 
and complex algorithms to facilitate “real-time” regulatory oversight — a development 
commonly referred to as regulatory technology or “regtech” (Arner, Barberis and Buckley 
2017, 371). As technology improves, it is increasingly difficult to know when to intervene, 
especially since errors in regulatory judgment (such as not having enough facts or data 
before establishing new rules) can stifle positive innovation and open up new problems 
(Fenwick, Kaal and Vermeulen, 2017). The challenge in using regtech is establishing 
an appropriate baseline for real-time supervision while enabling operational freedom 
(Baxter 2016, 603-604). However, regtech assumes that the digital oversight will be 
effective in its application and that additional government oversight will be minimal (Van 
Loo 2017, 1267).
Regulators are engaging in international regulatory data-sharing and collaboration 
agreements to avoid a “race to the bottom” (Lagarde 2018, 9). Fintech studies 
undertaken by the global-financial-standards Financial Action Task Force and the G20-
originated Financial Stability Board are positive steps in this regard (Lagarde 2018, 10). 
In August 2018, 11 global regulators and a World Bank Consultative Group proposed the 
Global Financial Innovation Network, which would serve as an international regulatory 
sandbox for multi-jurisdictional real-time product testing under supervisory review. In the 
U.S. the CFTC has expressed a willingness to co-ordinate with international regulators 
(Berry 2018). A recent example is its recent collaboration agreement with the FCA 
(CFTC 2018). Canada has been active in this regard as well. Several Canadian securities 
regulators have entered into agreements for fintech regulatory co-operation with 
Australia, France, Abu Dhabi and the United Kingdom (Stikeman Elliot 2018).
Another very important issue worth monitoring is whether new self-regulatory 
organizations (SROs) will be effective in fintech, particularly with cryptocurrency 
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firms and exchanges. This is timely given the recent launch of the Virtual Commodity 
Association, which was created by Tyler and Cameron Winklevoss, founders of the 
Gemini Trust Company (Vigna 2018). The main concern with a cryptocurrency SRO is that 
it can’t ensure member compliance without either a legislative mandate, or a credible 
threat that expulsion is a costly proposition to be avoided (Clements 2018). For example, 
if expulsion for non-compliance or the refusal to pay levied fines results in a firm no 
longer being able to do business in the industry, then a non-legislative mandate can be 
feasible (Clements 2018). This factor has been called a “market power” theory of SRO 
effectiveness (Macey and Novograd 2012, 966). This is not currently the case in crypto-
asset trading.
The role that fintech plays in the continued complexifying of financial-market operations, 
participants, intermediary functions, products, services and underlying technology 
should be further studied (Schwarcz 2009, 213). Professor Dan Awrey (2012, 241) 
has described innovation a “process of change” — not necessarily one that implies 
improvement. As financial markets continue to complexify, regulators must be continually 
mindful of iatrogenic responses if poorly constructed laws are enacted that drive further 
system complexity and unintended effects. There are also uncertainties on the wider 
social impacts of fintech, including its impact on marginalized classes and income 
inequality problems (Bartlett et al. 2017; World Bank Group 2018). Additionally, the future 
of cryptocurrency as a money substitute is uncertain, as well as its net environmental 
impact. Also, no one knows the extent to which it will integrate into shadow-banking and 
wholesale-funding markets, its continuing impact on monetary policy, and the likelihood 
that central banks will inevitability utilize their own blockchain-based digital currency 
(Lane 2018). 
Finally, principles-based frameworks (and sandboxes) are not a panacea. Professor 
Steven Schwarcz (2009, 264-265) notes that, even though principles-based systems are 
commonly used for fast-changing systems, our ever-more complex and “internationalized” 
financial markets (spurred by fintech) makes it “increasingly harder for regulators and 
market participants to act together as a community” and this, in turn, makes principles-
based regimes not as effective. Also, as identified by SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce 
(2018), sandboxes may be slow to keep pace with innovation and thus, self-certification 
mechanisms may be worth exploring. Future studies should be undertaken on the 
externalities of principles-based regimes and sandboxes, including whether they introduce 
a greater propensity for regulatory bias, regulatory capture, or competition distortion. 
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